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Challenge · 72Services
Storage: buckets, RLS on files & signed URLs
Storageused in ~75% of apps
DevLog needs avatar uploads. The instinct is to treat Storage as a separate product with its own rules — special dashboard, special permissions screen. It isn't. `storage.objects` is a Postgres table, and "a user may only touch their own avatar" is a policy you already know how to write, on a table you've never seen, with one new trick: the folder in a file path is just a column, and the row you're securing is a file.
Core idea. Storage buckets are namespaces backed by two ordinary tables — `storage.buckets` and `storage.objects` — and `storage.objects` takes RLS with the exact USING/WITH CHECK grammar from concept 53. The "userId-as-first-folder" convention (store every file at `<uid>/name.ext`) turns four policies — one per command — into a single repeated pattern: `(storage.foldername(name))[1] = auth.uid()::text`. A public bucket skips RLS for reads only — writes are always gated; a private bucket needs either a passing SELECT policy or a time-boxed signed URL; and a signed *upload* URL minted with the service role bypasses RLS entirely, so the server that mints it must validate the path itself.
poke it, drag it,
try to break it
try to break it
no slides here.
you drive.
you drive.
Playground, this isn't a screenshot
as
touching
storage.foldername(name)
[alice-uid][1] =auth.uid()::textforbob-uid= false
Denied — bob does not own
alice-uid. USING fails: list()/download return nothing, no error."Public" only ever changes the select row above. Every insert, update and deletepolicy still runs, public bucket or not — "public" means anyone can read the URL, never that anyone can write to it.
↑ play a little first, then dig in