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Challenge · 50Auth: Who Is Asking?

Asymmetric JWT signing keys & JWKS

Authused in ~55% of apps

A teammate leaks the project's JWT secret. You rotate it immediately, congratulating yourselves on a fast response — and every currently signed-in user on DevLog is logged out at once, mid-session, because verifying any token, old or new, required that exact secret and it no longer exists. That is the world symmetric signing forces you to live in. It is not the world Supabase ships by default anymore, and knowing why is what makes getClaims() (concept 49) actually work the way it claims to.

Core idea. Supabase signs every user's JWT with a private key that never leaves its servers, and publishes the matching public key at a JWKS endpoint — so anyone who needs to check a token (your server, calling getClaims()) can verify its signature locally, with no network call and no shared secret to protect. Because signing and verifying use two different keys, rotating the signing key is zero-downtime: a new key issues new tokens immediately, while the old public key keeps validating tokens already in flight until you deliberately revoke it.
Playground, this isn't a screenshot
Symmetric (HS256, legacy)Asymmetric (ES256, current)
Who can signAnyone holding the shared secretOnly Supabase — the private key never leaves
Who can verifyAlso only the secret holder — same object as signingAnyone, from the published public key
Verify without a network call?Only if you have a local copy of the secretYes — WebCrypto against a cached public key
Rotation costEvery unexpired token everywhere is invalidated at onceZero-downtime — old key keeps validating until revoked
↑ play a little first, then dig in